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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: //2A-6/22/82 
In the Matter, of : 
SYLVAN-VERONA BEACH COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT,: BOARD DECISION 
Respondent, : AND ORDER 
-and- : 
: CASE NO. U-5539 
:-SYEVAN-VERONA -BEACH-:TEAGHE-RS-^ &S0GX^ XONV---^ -------..^ --^ .-..r-:^ :.-^ --..-^ -.-: •-
Charging Party. : 
KENNETH P. RAY AND ANTHONY J. LaFACHE, P.O. 
(ANTHONY J. LaFACHE, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
MELINDA DOUD, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Sylvan-
Verona Beach Common School District (District) to a hearing 
officer's decision that it violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith by repudiating an agreement with the Sylvan-Verona Beach 
Teachers Association (Association). The District has asserted 
that no agreement had been reached because of a mutual misunder-
standing of the meaning of what was alleged to be an agreement. 
FACTS 
The District is headed by a three-member Board of Trustees 
and a superintendent/principal. In the instant and prior negoti-
ations, the District was represented by the three members of its 
Board of Trustees. The negotiations in question extended over 
four sessions, the last of which took place, on April 8, 1981. 
There were only two significant issues: whether the number of 
steps on the salary schedule should'be increased; and what the 
'•**'•• n^Qu 
' „ anItfitCj 
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salary schedule should be. The Association's demands were that 
there be an "increase [in] the number of steps on the salary 
schedule" and that "each cell of the salary schedule shall be 
increased by 13%"- The term "cell" had not beennusedlin prior 
negotiations and, as explained by the Association's negotiators, 
it meant the various blocks that were established on the salary 
s^l^ hellulls^ by ^ tb^-^^^ 
years of service, and the horizontal rows, signifying postgraduate 
education credits. 
Some time during the course of negotiations, the parties 
agreed that there would be three additional steps on the schedule, 
and on April 8 they agreed that there would be a 10% salary 
increase in each cell for the three succeeding school years.— 
No memorandum of understanding was signed on April 8 because 
of the lateness of-the hour and because a social hour had been 
planned by the parties. It was agreed that the Association's 
negotiator would prepare a memorandum of understanding and submit 
it to the District for signature the following day. A document 
was prepared and submitted the following day, but it was not 
signed by the District at that time. Three weeks later, on May 1, 
1981, the District indicated that it would not sign the memorandum. 
According to the Association's chief negotiator, the reason given 
by the District for its refusal to sign was that the beginning 
—' According to the Association's chief negotiatorv the District 
had proposed a 107o increase on individual salaries and she had 
counterproposed lan 11% increase in each cell. The parties then 
compromised on a 10% increase in each cell. This is consistent 
with the testimony of the District's chief negotiator that 
teachers who were to receive salary increases were also to < 
move on the salary schedule. 
* 7589 
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salaries were too high. The District has not denied that assertion, 
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees, who was its chief 
negotiator, testified that by May 1,, he came to realize that he and 
the Association had a different understanding of what their agree-
ment meant. It was his position that the District had agreed simply 
to a 107o increase for each teacher and that the Association belie\ed 
irhalr :th:e~-sLaTaxfe^  
cell to the next on the salary schedule were to receive an incre-
ment in addition to the 10%, yielding for them a 13% increase. 
The hearing officer concluded that the evidence established 
that a salary agreement had been reached for existing grades on 
April 8, 1981, and that the agreement called for a 10% increase in 
addition to. increments. Accordingly, he recommended that the 
District be ordered to cease denying, that- there: is, an agreement...'-'' 
2/ ; 
on;;the, salarie's^ jin", the:.:existing, grades:;.— 
2 / . . , 
The hearing officer further concluded that the negotiations had 
not resolved all the issues still before the parties because the 
evidence submitted to him did not show any agreement on the 
salaries to be paid to the teachers in the three new salary 
grades. His proposed order required the District to execute a 
contract containing the basic salary agreement only after the 
parties agreed upon the salaries for the new grades. The parties 
did not deal with the salaries for the new grades in their nego-
tiations. Neither the charge nor the answer addressed this issue; 
and the evidence in the record was not directed to it. Accord-
ingly, we, too, do not address it. A collective bargaining 
agreement need not be a total agreement on all issues in dispute. 
There is, of course, a continuing duty to negotiate as to terms 
and conditions of employment still at issue. Wappinger CSD, 5 
PERB 1(3074 (1972) ; Dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuld in 
PBA v. City of New York. 27 NY2d 410, 418 (1971); Franklin 
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 NLRB 276 (1949). 
?.. 7600 
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The Exceptions 
The District's exceptions allege that the hearing officer 
committed errors and improprieties in the conduct of the hearing; 
that his findings of fact are not supported by the evidence; and 
that his recommended order violates statutory and constitutional 
law. 
We have reviewed the record and find that the hearing officer 
made no incorrect or unfair rulings and engaged in no improper 
conduct.— 
On the merits, we find that the evidence supports the conclu-
sions of the hearing officer. While the District's negotiators 
may not have understood the implications of their agreement, such 
a misunderstanding is not a valid basis for repudiating the 
4/ agreement.— 
The District argues further that the agreement, if any, would 
not have been binding under the Taylor Law for two reasons. The 
first is that, contrary to the statutory definition, the agreement 
was not the result of the exchange of mutual nromises between an 
employee organization and the chief executive officer of a public 
3/ 
-The allegation that the hearing officer acted improperly is not 
based upon the record. The allegation is that the hearing 
officer "met alone with the representatives of the charging 
party during a coffee break with no representatives of the • 
respondent present." Investigating this allegation, we solicited 
affidavits from the parties. These revealed no impropriety on 
the part of the hearing officer. 
4/ See Union Springs Central School Teachers Association, 6 PERB 
113074 (1973), in which the negotiators for the teachers' associa-
tion accepted the recommendation of a fact finder without having 
fully understood its implications. The subsequent recommendation 
that the Association's membership reject the agreement on that 
ground was determined to be improper. 
# 7££Vf 
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employer. Here, it asserts, the exchange of promises, if any, was 
between the Association and the District's Trustees, its legislative: 
body, rather, than with the supervising principal, its Chief Execu-
tive Officer. This argument is not persuasive on the facts before 
us. The District's Chief Executive Officer acquiesced in the. 
Trustees' assumption of his negotiation responsibilities and the 
Trustees acted under color q:f. authority to negotiate an agreement 
on behalf of the District by holding themselves out to the Associa-
tion as having that authority. The second assertion.is that there 
could have been no binding agreement because additional funds for 
its implementation were not appropriated by the District's legisla-
tive body. This argument is inapplicable where, as here, the 
members of the legislative body were themselves the employer's 
negotiators. They must be deemed to have made the necessary appro-
priation by virtue of their agreement. They may not repudiate that 
agreement merely by asserting that r. they were acting in the capacity, 
as negotiators and in a different one as legislators.— 
—' See Union Springs, supra. Also see City of Rochester, 7 PERB 
113060 at p. 3101 (1974), in which we said: 
Just as employee organization negotiators must work for 
ratification of their agreement if ratification is 
required, so must employer negotiators seek approval of 
their agreement to the extent that approval is required, 
and. this applies to employer negotiators who may happen 
to be members of the employer's legislative body. 
Two other legal arguments of the District are also rejected. The 
District argues that the recommended remedy is illegal because it 
goes beyond a direction to the District to negotiate in good faith. 
This argument does not take cognizance of L... 1977, e.;..42;9 /which . 
amended the Taylor Law to authorize such a remedy. Finally, the 
District argues that the payment of salary increases pursuant to 
the recommended order would constitute a gift in violation of 
Article 8, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution. It is 
well established that 'the/ payments -would-' 'be •mad'e:'piirMuaht' to a 
collectively bargained contract to which, according to the 
evidence, the District agreed. Accordingly, it is not an 
unconstitutional gift. Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers 
of Huntington, Inc. , 30 NY 2d 122 (1972) , 5 PERB 1f7507~ 
. 76112 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District: 
1. to cease and desist from repudiating the 
agreement found herein; 
2. to execute a written contract in conformance 
with such agreement; and 
•'-
:
"- -— 3.- to post the--attached^-^ 
n o r m a l l y u s e d f o r communica t ions t o employees 
DATED: J u n e 2 1 , 1982 
Albany , New York 
/ H a r o l d R. Newman, CI hairman 
/&-6~ouQ.—-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees that: 
The Sylvan-Verona Beach Common School District will not 
refuse to execute an agreement with the Sylvan-Verona Beach 
Teachers Association providing for a 10% salary increase in 
addition to longevity increments. 
SYLVAN-VERONA. BEACH . CQMMO.N . S.CHOQL. DISTRICT 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-6/22/82 
In the Matter of .
 B 0 A R D DECISION AND ORDER 
LOCAL 2055, COUNCIL 66, AFSCME 
TT <-i, nu r „. T - ^ o 4-- : CASE NO. D-0201 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section: 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
' - - ROWLEY-AOTTTORRES%^vcr~(Wmjj3^-rmim~^(^:y''''-^—^--~-
of Counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ.. (ANTHONY CAGLIOSTRO, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
On January 15, 1981, Counsel to this Board (Charging Party)— 
filed a charge against Local 2055, Council 66, AFSCME (Local 2055) 
alleging that Local 2055 caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned 
and engaged in a strike against Capital District Regional Off-Track 
Betting Corporation (OTB) between July 2 and July"6, 1979. The 
hearing officer recommended that the charge be dismissed on the 
ground that the filing of the charge was not timely, and Charging 
Party has filed a brief with us in which he urges the rejection of 
2/ that recommendation.— 
There is no question but that employees of OTB in a unit 
represented by Local 2055 struck between July 2 and July 6, 1979. 
On July 26, 1979, less than three weeks after the strike was con-
—The charge was brought to satisfy our own statutory duty. See 
CSL §210.3(c) and Rule§206.2. 
-Considering the possibility that we would not dismiss the charge 
on the ground that, it was brought too late, the hearing officer 
considered the merits of the charge and he determined that Local 
2055 did condone and participate in a strike as charged. Local 
2055 has filed exceptions to that determination. As we conclude 
that the charge herein was nbte^e:£l!t±oii^lf"-ls-^u^M^~i^we-:dO"no^t 
consider ••.that, -part'-of"/the .hearing:.officer..' s.Ideciraibn^dealing" • • 
with its merits. 
Board - D-0201 -', 
eluded/- -OTB brought a'- charge 'alleging a'violation-of ' CSL •'•'§ 210 VI'-:-'. That ^charge" - • 
tftes'Gais'olidateS'with^se^ filed'by :b'6th?'parties"?:'';' 
Two-days?'of: hearings were held in June 1980. OTB and Local 2055 then 
resolved the still outstanding negotiation dispute before the 
hearing was resumed. This led to the withdrawal of the improper 
practice charges, and in August 1980, OTB notified PERB that it 
would-not-proceed-with--the-prose-G-ut-ion--of -tfae--s-trike-Gha-rg-e-because 
it would be "unable to establish that respondent unions did engage 
in a willful defiance [of CSL §210.1]." 
Five months after OTB had ceased prosecution of its charge, 
Charging Party filed the charge herein. 
In concluding that the charge was not timely, the hearing 
officer determined that the language of CSL §210.3(c) is disposi-
tive of the matter. It provides: 
[T]he chief legal officer of the government involved, or 
the board on its own motion, shall forthwith institute 
proceedings before the board to determine whether such 
employee organization has violated the provisions of 
subdivision one of this section. (emphasis supplied) 
The hearing officer concluded that this language precludes the con-
sideration of a strike charge that is not brought "as soon as 
possible™after ^Charging Party is" made aware of a strike. 
While we do not read CSL §210.3(c) as narrowly as the hearing 
3/ 
officer does,— we agree that it evidences a public policy,that 
37 
— The word "forthwith" may not impose a statutory limitation on the 
time when a charge may be brought. If read together with CSL 
§213 (e), it may mean direct action which, if not taken "forthwith 
can be compelled in a taxpayer action. CSL §213(e) provides: 
The failure to perform the duties required by subdivisions 
two and three of section two hundred ten of this chapter 
and by section two hundred eleven of this chapter shall 
be reviewable in a proceeding under article seventy-eight 
of the civil practice law and rules by any taxpayer, as 
defined in section one hundred two of this chapter. Any 
such taxpayer shall also have standing to institute any 
action described in subdivisions one and two of section 
one hundred two of this chapter. ^.^^ 
Board - D-0201 
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strike charges will be brought with reasonable expedition. The 
charge herein was brought.more than eighteen months after the 
strike. 
Although §206. 2 (b)' of our Rules of Procedure provides that 
tld~un"s~el~"td""this"Eolir 
government involved in a strike may intervene as a party when 
the .other has brought a strike charge, we do not read this rule 
as requiring such intervention. Similarly, it was not necessary 
for Charging Party to bring a charge during the first thirteen 
months after the strike while 0TB's strike charge was pending. 
The fact.that Charging Party did not bring a charge on our 
behalf, or intervene in the original proceeding, while 0TB's 
charge was pending was not inconsistent with the public policy 
that charges be brought with reasonable expedition. However, 
there' is no showing in the record of a reasonable basis for 
allowing five additional months to elapse after 0TB abandoned 
its charge until the filing of the instant charge.; ..Without 
regard to the hearing officer's interpretation of the requirements 
of CSL §210.3(c), we find that the charge herein, which was 
brought to satisfy our own statutory duty, was not filed with 
reasonable expedition. Accordingly, we will not consider its 
merits. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and.it 
Board - D-0201 .-4-
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: June 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
M*u y ^ 2 ^ c ^ _ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David G. Rand!es*, Memt/er 
Board Chairman Harold R. Newman did not participate in the 
consideration of this case. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 




CASE NO. 0-5327 
ARNOLD W. PROSKIN, P.C., for 
Respondent 
MICHAEL HARTNER, pro se 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Michael Hartner 
to a hearing officer's decision which dismissed his charge 
alleging that the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) 
committed an improper practice as defined in §2 09-a.2 of the 
Public Empl-oyees Fair Employment Act by violating the duty owed 
to him to represent him fairly. 
FACTS 
Hartner, an employee of the New York State Department of 
Corrections (DOC) filed a contractual grievance against that 
Department and the Civil Service Department (DCS). Throughout the 
first three steps, the first two within DOC and the third before 
the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (OER), the grievance 
was supported by PEF. The grievance, which related to DCS having 
refused to appoint him to a permanent position, was denied by OER 
In the Matter of 
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on the basis that DCS1 actions did not violate the contract. 
OER's decision was issued on May 20, 1980. On June 3, 1980, 
Hartner wrote to Peretti, PEF's Staff Director, requesting that 
the matter be submitted to arbitration. Briscoe, a PEF, field 
representative, responded by letter dated June 13, 1980. He 
advised Hartner that he and Peretti had discussed the matter and 
both agreed that Hartner.'s grievance did not set forth a contract 
violation. Briscoe's letter informed Hartner that PEF would not 
submit the matter to arbitration and recommended that Hartner 
appeal DCS' action to the Civil Service Commission, whose 
decision, if unsatisfactory, could be challenged in court. 
Hartner appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On 
August 7, 198 0, the Civil Service Commission denied the appeal. 
Hartner sought to have PEF bring an Article 7 8 proceeding to 
review the decision of the Civil Service Commission. On 
November 11, 1980, Briscoe advised Hartner in a telephone conver-
sation that Small, PEF's Director of Research, had concluded 
that the matter warranted no further attention. On November 14, 
198 0, Hartner discussed the matter with Small, who was persuaded 
that the matter was actionable. Small asked Hartner to write to 
Briscoe, summarizing the points discussed, so that the matter 
could be forwarded to PEF's counsel for action. Hartner wrote 
such a letter, which was forwarded to Proskin by a cover letter 
from Small which requested that legal proceedings be commenced. 
Proskin responded that legal proceedings could be commenced only 
7nm-
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upon the instruction of PEF officials at a higher level and that 
Small direct his correspondence to them. This was done and 
Payne, PEF's Regional Director, solicited Proskin's view. In a 
letter dated December 2, 1980, a copy of which was sent to 
Hartner, Proskin replied that it was his opinion that the 
complaints involved matters lying within the discretion of the 
Civil Service Commission and, therefore, suit was not warranted. 
Hartner then commenced an Article 78 proceeding through private 
counsel. The Article 78 proceeding was settled by the appointment 
of Hartner to an Education Supervisor position in DOC on March 5, 
1981. 
HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION. 
Hartner's improper practice charge claimed that PEF's 
actions with respect to his grievance and his request to it to 
appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission violated 
V 
its duty of fair representation. 
The hearing officer dismissed as untimely those parts of the 
charge which alleged that PEF's handling of Hartner's grievance . 
proceeding and its decision not to seek arbitration violated its 
1/ An employee organization that fails to fairly and impartially 
represent an employee in the negotiating umt-O-f.. whifoh it is. the 
representative, interferes with the rights of the employee 
in violation of §2 09-a.2 of the Act. See, e.g., Brighton 
Transportation Association, 10 PERB 1(30.90 (1977); United 
Federation of Teachers (Barnett) , 14 PERB 1(3 017 (1981) . 
Board - U-532 7 -4 
duty of fair representation. 
With respect to PEF's handling of Hartner's request that PEF 
institute an Article 78 proceeding to review the decision of the 
Civil Service Commission, the hearing officer reasoned that 
because PEF was under no statutory duty to institute an Article 78 
pxjDceeding -for :Harj^ 
breached only if it provided the service to others and discrim-
inated against Hartner in not providing it to him. Finding there 
was no evidence of discrimination, he dismissed this remaining 
aspect of the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Hartner's exceptions relate to the conduct of the hearing 
officer; (1) the hearing officer granted a motion made on the 
hearing date to dismiss part of the charge as untimely without 
PEF having raised untimeliness as a defense in its answer and 
(2) the hearing officer treated some of his claims unfavorably 
while not addressing others. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of the 
hearing officer. 
Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure authorizes 
the filing of improper practice charges alleging the commission 
of improper practices within four months of the filing of the 
charge. Section 204.2(a) provides that PERB*s Director of Public 
a Ti k* 
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Employment Practices and Representation shall, at the initial 
stage of processing, review charges to determine whether they are 
timely. If he determines that they are not, said section directs 
that he dismiss them. Section 204.3(c) (2) provides that the answer 
to a charge shall set forth untimeliness as an affirmative defense. 
F^-inally,-::§-2_Gj4:. 7XIX -authorizes -a_Jiearing of ficer, _at a -hearingi,--- ----
upon a motion made, or on his own initiative, to dismiss a charge 
as untimely if the failure of timeliness was first revealed during 
the hearing. 
The petitioner's charge sets forth a lengthy series of events 
culminating within four months of the time when the charge was 
filed. Events set forth in the charge which occurred more than 
four months prior to its filing could be read as relating to 
,-events which occurred within such four month period. In fact, as 
set forth in the hearing officer.-^ decision, he did consider some 
such events in relation to the claim that PEF violated its duty 
of fair representation by refusing to institute an Article 78 
proceeding, which claim was dismissed on the merits. Under these 
circumstances, it was appropriate for the hearing officer, on the 
hearing date, to entertain a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
§204.7(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure, by which time it became 
evident that the stale events relating to the processing of the 
grievance and refusal to take it to arbitration were being claimed 
to be improper practices. 
As to the failure to prosecute the Article 78 proceeding, 
we agree with the hearing officer's conclusion that an employee 
organization's duty of fair representation does not include 
^ ^ Q 
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the obligation to prosecute lawsuits on behalf of members of the 
unit it represents unless it has provided that service for others 
and it can be shown that the employee organization is discriminating 
against the charging party in not providing it to him. There being 
no evidence that PEF instituted such lawsuits on behalf of others, 
the hearing officer was correct in concluding that PEF did -not •••'-• 
violate its duty of fair representation by refusing to institute 
an Article 7 8 proceeding on Hartman's behalf to review the Civil 
Service Commission's decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the hearing officer's decision, 
and WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: June 21, 1982 
Albany, New York 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
7614 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-





CASE NO. U-5703 
ARNOLD W. PROSKIN, P.C., for Respondent 
HARRY FARKAS, pro se, _.-,. Cx, ..;,-.., :-. - ,• . v 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Harry Farkas 
to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge that the 
Public Employees Federation (PEF) improperly refused to represent 
him in connection with his protest of restrictions imposed upon 
the taking of Civil Service competitive examinations. 
On July 17, 1981, the New York State Department of Civil 
Service (Department) announced both promotional and open competi-
tive examinations for two positions for which Farkas was eligible, 
but it would not allow applicants to take both the promotional and 
open competitive examinations. Farkas complained about this 
restriction to PEF on the ground that the Department's procedure 
violated the "merit principle" of the State Constitution and he 
asked PEF to oppose the restriction. PEF notified Farkas on 
July 21, 1981, that it would not oppose the restriction. Its 
response did. not refer to Farkas' constitutional argument but 
stated that the procedure was. consistent with the Department's 
7ft to 
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published rules and regulations. It further indicated that it 
understood the reason for the rule. 
After complaining to the Department unsuccessfully, Farkas 
wrote to PEF on September 3, 1981, and again asked it to oppose 
the Department's procedure. PEF responded on September 10 saying 
that" it had7 notT changed T ^ 
oppose the procedure. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge on the ground that 
PEF violated no duty of representation toward Farkas as defined 
by this Board and the courts. It considered his complaint promptly 
and informed him of its disagreement with him without delay. That 
disagreement did not reflect discrimination, gross negligence or 
irresponsibility. 
Having reviewed the record and considered Farkas' arguments 
in support of his exceptions, we adopt the material findings of 
fact and the conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: June 21, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus, Member 
7R16 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5648 
PACHMAN, OSHRIN & BLOCK, P.C. (ALAN D. 
OSHRIN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
FRANK SAYERS, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Wyandanch 
Union Free School District (District) to a hearing officer's 
decision that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
when it unilaterally eliminated four paid holidays for school 
secretaries while under an obligation to negotiate an agreement 
with the Wyandanch Secretaries Association, NYEA/NEA (Association) 
to succeed one that had expired. 
The Association and the District had been parties to a 
three-year contract which expired on June 30, 1981. The contract 
specified that the unit employees would have a one-day holiday 
during the Christmas recess. Annexed to the contract, and 
expressly made a part of it, was a nonprofessional calendar 
7fif? 
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which, for 1979-80 and 1980-81, gave secretaries five days off 
with pay during the Christmas season. 
While the parties were negotiating a contract for the 1981-
82 school year, the District announced that secretaries would 
have to work four days during the Christmas week without receiving 
any adaXtTohaT pay Tor '"tfiat"~workT""~ 
The hearing offic er determined that he did not require a 
hearing as all the material facts were before him and he found 
that the District acted unilaterally in violation of its duty 
to negotiate in good faith. He ordered the District to give 
affected employees four consecutive days off with pay, the days 
to be chosen by the Association. He further ordered the District 
"to cease and desist from unilaterally altering terms and 
conditions of employment." 
In support of its exceptions, the District argues that the 
hearing officer erred in failing to hold a hearing. It asserts 
that, if a hearing had been held, the evidence would have 
established three significant facts: that the District had 
negotiated in good faith before taking the unilateral action; 
that.the parties' failure to reach an agreement was attributable 
to the Association's negotiations posture; that it was required 
to adopt a secretarial calendar at the time when it did. 
According to the District, it would thus have established all the 
elements necessary for a determination that it acted properly 
in accordance with our decisions in Wappinger, 5 PERB If3074 (1972) 
and Cohoes, 12 PERB 1(3113 (1979). 
M8 
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The District also argues that, even if it were found to have 
violated the Taylor Law, the hearing officer's recommended order 
would be defective in two particulars. By giving the Association 
the right to decide when.the employees can take their vacations, 
the order deprives the District of an essential management 
respons ibility:.—.:. Also-,--the—pr-Ovis-i:on--th:at--it-mus-t-noti-al-ter 
"terms and conditions of employment''' should have been expressly 
restricted to mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
We do not find any merit in the District's argument that'.its 
offer of proof would establish a right under Wappinger and Cohoes 
to take the action in question. Those cases hold that an employer 
may take unilateral action with respect to a mandatory subject 
of negotiation where (1) there are compelling reasons for the 
employer to act unilaterally at the time when it does so, (2) it 
had negotiated the change in good faith to the point where 
negotiations were deadlocked, and (3) it was willing to continue 
such negotiations. 
Only the third of the three elements which, together, permit 
an employer to act unilaterally, is alleged to be present here. 
There is no allegation of a compelling reason for the employer to 
act unilaterally at the time when it did. The parties' expired 
agreement provided that the employer could require overtime work 
of unit employees at premium pay of time-and-a-half, except for 
work on Sundays when double-time is required. Thus, the District 
was not compelled to act unilaterally in order to assure itself 
of secretarial help during the Christmas recess; it merely had to 
•invoke its continuing right to require overtime work. 
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The offer of proof also fails to show the second element 
of a Wappinger/Cohoes justification of unilateral action. It 
does not allege the exhaustion of impasse procedures which would 
indicate the existence of a genuine deadlock in negotiations. 
Accordingly, the hearing officer did not err in denying 
the District's request for a hearing. 
We do find merit in the District's objection to the first 
part of the remedial order. Inasmuch as the prior contract 
provides for premium pay for overtime work required by the 
District, the District should have been ordered to provide that 
premium pay rather than to permit the employees to take time 
off on dates to be chosen by the Association. Such a remedy was 
ordered in Farmingdale, 11 PERB 1[3055 (1978) , when a public 
employer had improperly instructed employees to work on the day 
after Thanksgiving Day, That public employer was directed to 
compensate the employees at the premium rate provided by the 
parties' contract for overtime. 
We do not agree with the District that the part of the 
recommended order directing it to cease and desist from 
unilaterally altering terms and conditions of employment was 
improper. As used in the statute, the words "terms and 
conditions of employment" clearly mean mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District: 
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1. to pay the affected unit employees for the four 
days that they worked during Christmas week in 
1981 at the premium rate set forth in their prior 
agreement, plus interest thereon at the rate of 
three percent per annum; 
terms and conditions of employment; 
'3. to negotiate in good faith with the Association; 
and 
4. to post the notice in the form attached at all 
locations."regularly used for communications with 
employees in the negotiating unit represented by 
the Association. 
DATED: June 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
w^/zf: 
Harold R.' Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 




NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the negotiating unit represented by the 
Wyandanch Secretaries Association, NYEA, NEA that we will: 
1. pay the affected unit employees for the four days that 
they worked during Christmas week in 1981 at the 
premium rate set forth in our prior agreement, plus 
interest thereon at the rate.of three percent per 
annum; 
2. not unilaterally alter terms and conditions of 
employment; 
3. negotiate in good faith with the Wyandanch Secretaries 
Association, NYEA/ NEA. 
Wyandanch. Union. Free .School .District. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^£?AO 
STATE OF NEW.YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELAT?~1S BOARD 
%., the Matter of 
BOCES, THIRD SUPERVISORY DISTRICT, 
SUFFOLK COUNTY, 
- a n d -
E m p l o y e r , 
#3A- 6/22/82 
Case No. C-2370 




BOCES #3 UNIT, CSEA, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
C H A P T E R
' . intervener.-
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
-—---;--—-A—r-epresentair-ion-pr-oceeding^ 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the .Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT-IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
Alliance of School Based Therapists and Nurses 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described, below,' as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.-..'. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles:, physical 
therapy assistant,, dental hygienist, occupational 
therapist, registered nurse, physical therapist, 
supervising physical therapist, assistant occupational 
therapist, supervising occupational therapist 
Excluded: All other employees 
. Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with 
Alliance, of School Based Therapists and Nurses 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard .to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of June ,: 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, M 
no,n>'. 
